Europe is once again discussing the formation of its own defense alliance. The idea of a European army, repeatedly raised since the early days of the Cold War, was revived in February by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Zelensky argues that Donald Trump’s withdrawal of military support for Ukraine, as well as his ambivalence toward the EU, make it clear that the EU urgently needs its own military force. This debate, which, despite its long history, has failed to find consensus in Europe, has been reignited by Zelensky’s comments.
Spain’s Socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez is the latest EU leader to heed Zelensky’s call. According to a 2022 YouGov poll, 64 percent of Spaniards support his position. On March 28, he declared that Europe needed its own defense force to counter “old imperialist impulses in Russia,” especially in light of reduced support from the United States. He called for a military force composed of soldiers from all 27 member states, operating under a single flag with common goals. Sánchez also emphasized the need for greater economic integration within the bloc and proposed a debt-pooling program—a proposal that sparked tensions similar to the debate over a common army.
Despite Sánchez’s passionate rhetoric, there are suspicions that his call for an EU army is motivated by self-interest. He faces pressure from both the EU and the United States to increase Spain’s defense spending. At the same time, anti-military sentiment is strong in the country, and he governs in coalition with Sumar, a left-wing alliance that opposes increased investment in the military and troops. By claiming that EU defense is a collective responsibility, Sánchez may be trying to distract from his own political challenges.
The EU already cooperates to some extent in the defense field. At any given time, at least one multinational battle group of 1,500 troops is on standby. These reached operational capability in 2007, but according to Eurocorps, the multinational military headquarters, “problems related to political will, usability, and financial solidarity have prevented their deployment.” The same challenges would arise within an EU army, but on a much larger scale. There is also the European Maritime Force, established in 1995 by Spain, France, Italy, and Portugal to conduct sea control, crisis response operations, and humanitarian missions. Proponents of an EU army argue that while these collaborative forces represent an important pillar of the bloc’s defense, they are ill-equipped for protracted conflicts. They also emphasize that the EU is too dependent on the US to protect its values—a point with which Trump 2.0 would agree.
The idea of an EU army was first proposed in the early 1950s to build military capabilities against the Soviet Union without rearming the Federal Republic of Germany. The proposal originated with the French government and included the six founding members of the EU: France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, West Germany, and Belgium. In 1952, a treaty establishing the European Defense Community was signed but never ratified; instead, West Germany joined NATO and the Western Union, a military alliance established in 1948.
This decades-old idea was revived in 2016. Then, as now, the perceived threat from Russia intensified the debate, especially after the sudden withdrawal of a military heavyweight. Following the Brexit referendum, in which 52 percent of Britons voted to leave the EU, the prime ministers of Hungary and the Czech Republic called for a European army. They were joined by Ursula von der Leyen, then German Defense Minister, who declared that Europe needed a “Schengen of defense” – a reference to the continent’s borderless Schengen area, which consists of 29 nations (four of which are not part of the EU). Jean-Claude Juncker, her predecessor as President of the EU Commission, had said a year earlier that the EU needed its own army to “send a clear message to Russia that we are serious about defending our European values.” Whenever these values are perceived to be under threat, the old idea of an EU army is revived.
Since Brexit, the discussion has gained momentum. The idea was put forward in 2018 by then German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the former French President Emmanuel Macron supported this. A furious Trump, then in the middle of his first term, saw it as an act of ingratitude toward NATO: “They started learning German in Paris before the US arrived,” he tweeted (a misleading reference to World War II). Ursula von der Leyen, President of the EU Commission since 2019, has called for a “European Defense Union” and last month unveiled “Rearm Europe”—a five-year plan that was quickly renamed “Readiness 2030” after Spain and Italy raised concerns that the original title was too militaristic. (Sánchez did not explain how this objection fits with his call for an EU combat force, which presumably should be equipped with more than just goodwill.) Von der Leyen plans to mobilize €800 billion for the bloc’s defense over the next five years, while some analysts fear that Russia could be ready to attack a NATO or EU member by then. Italy’s Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani also supports the idea of an EU army.
However, Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief and vice-president of the European Commission, argues that such an army is unnecessary. More importantly, she argues that the bloc’s 27 armies “are capable and able to work together effectively to deter our rivals and defend Europe.” This view is supported by Poland’s Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, who is convinced that an EU army “will not happen,” and also by Denmark, which has historically viewed NATO as the continent’s most important defense mechanism. During its membership in the Union, the United Kingdom rejected the idea of an EU army for the same reason, arguing that it would unnecessarily duplicate NATO.
One of the biggest practical challenges is how to finance a 27-nation army. The question of mutual financing has also arisen in the context of the EU’s demands for members to increase their national defense budgets – here, too, there is no agreement. Instead of the cheap loans proposed by von der Leyen as part of the “Readiness 2030” plan, heavily indebted southern countries like Spain and Italy prefer joint defense bonds or grants, like those distributed during the pandemic. This proposal has reignited an existing conflict among wealthier northern members like Germany and the Netherlands, who are reluctant to finance joint initiatives: “No Eurobonds,” declared Dutch Prime Minister Dick Schoof after a meeting of EU leaders at the end of March. Another possibility, as recently suggested by the French Minister of Economy, would be to raise taxes, especially on wealthy citizens.
Sánchez demands that the EU reconsider the idea of a common army, arguing that individual members are unable to find common ground in defense. But the same problem could also prevent the creation of an EU combat force. Since their creation almost 20 years ago, none of the EU battle groups, which typically consist of troops from three or four countries, have been activated. This hardly indicates that the bloc is ready to form a 27-nation army, controlled from Brussels and flying a blue and gold flag.
