How Sánchez Made Spain China’s Trojan Horse in Europe

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How Sánchez Made Spain China's Trojan Horse in Europe
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The relationship between Spain and China has developed into a profound strategic alliance in recent years under the leadership of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, with significant support from former Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. What began in 2018 with a high-profile visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Madrid has evolved into a partnership that, in the eyes of many observers—especially from Washington and Brussels—is transforming Spain into China’s “Trojan Horse” in Europe. This development is particularly notable given the ongoing trade conflict between the USA and China and the growing skepticism of the European Union towards Beijing’s economic practices.

The Beginnings: Sánchez’s First Overture to Beijing

In November 2018, just five months into his term, Pedro Sánchez hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping. This meeting was not only the first by a Chinese head of state in Spain in 13 years but also Xi’s first visit to the European continent after his re-election. It was a clear signal from Beijing, which was seeking partners in Europe to counter the trade war initiated by the Donald Trump administration. This pivotal meeting laid the groundwork for an “update and renewal of strategic relations between Spain and China.”

Numerous Memoranda of Understanding followed, aiming to intensify cooperation in areas such as employment, social security, science, technology, innovation, and culture. Particularly noteworthy were the export protocols for table grapes and pork, as well as investment agreements with a dozen Spanish companies, including heavyweights like Telefónica, Seat, and the Instituto de Crédito Oficial (ICO).

The Huawei War and Spain’s Stance

The outbreak of the US-China trade war in May 2019, particularly the inclusion of Huawei on the US trade blacklist, put Spain in a dilemma. Washington warned of the security risks posed by Chinese telecommunications equipment, especially concerning future 5G networks, and urged European allies to impose similar restrictions. While Germany and France tended to comply with these demands, Spain positioned itself differently.

This is where the consulting firm Acento, founded by José Blanco and Alfonso Alonso, came into play. Acento, with Huawei as one of its first major clients, vigorously defended the interests of the Chinese tech giant in the European Parliament and in Spain. Its primary goal was to prevent Spanish telecommunications companies such as Telefónica, Vodafone, and Orange from excluding Huawei from their mobile and 5G networks.

In October 2020, Pedro Sánchez publicly stated that Spain would not block Chinese manufacturers like Huawei and ZTE—a surprise to many, as other European countries were already discussing restrictions. It later emerged that Spain had chosen Huawei in the same year as the provider for storing confidential citizen data for social security. Other state entities, such as ADIF and the Ministry of Interior, also continued to rely on Chinese technology. This success of Acento is closely linked to the role of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who is considered the architect of the relationship between Acento, Huawei, and the Spanish government, significantly convincing Sánchez and his team to support the company. It was even revealed that Huawei had been responsible since 2005 for the computer system that stores wiretaps conducted during judicial investigations, a contract that began under Zapatero and was resumed in 2018 under the PSOE government.

The Ukraine War and the Missed 5G List

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022 led to increased pressure from NATO and the EU to distance themselves from Russian and Chinese influence. Nevertheless, Spain remained firm on Huawei. Although the then Minister of Economy, Nadia Calviño, proposed a 5G cybersecurity law in May 2022, which was to introduce a list of high-risk suppliers—potentially including Chinese companies—this initiative fizzled out. By November 2022, when Sánchez and Xi Jinping met at the G20 summit in Brazil, the deadline for creating this list had expired, and Calviño later confirmed that the list was no longer a priority.

During this period, Zapatero intensified his activities as a lobbyist for Chinese interests. As chairman of the advisory board of the Gate Center think tank, he frequently traveled to China to articulate trade relations not only for Spain but also for Latin America. Much of the agenda for Sánchez’s subsequent visits to Beijing was organized by Zapatero’s team.

Escalation of Investments and Brussels’ Displeasure

Zapatero’s efforts bore fruit, and in March 2023, Sánchez traveled to Beijing with a large retinue. Despite EU pressure for accountability and transparency, Sánchez sought ways to deepen relations and go beyond cooperation with Huawei.

In December 2023, the EU intensified its criticism of China’s trade practices, accusing Beijing of a “huge imbalance in trade” caused by state subsidies for Chinese companies. However, Spain remained unfazed. In February 2024, Sánchez received Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who asked Spain to intervene in Brussels. A few days later, the then Minister for Digital Transformation, José Luis Escrivá, declared that there would be “no list of suppliers excluded from 5G,” officially freeing Huawei and ZTE from any risks.

The climax of this development was the signing of the first major Chinese investment agreement in Spain in April 2024: the company Chery took over the former Nissan factory in Barcelona to produce 150,000 cars with Chinese technology by 2029, accompanied by an investment of 400 million euros and the creation of up to 1,250 jobs. This agreement made Spain China’s gateway to Europe and allowed the Chinese giant to circumvent impending EU tariffs. Despite Brussels’s concerns and pressure to tighten restrictions on Huawei, Spain adhered to its commitments and expected further investments. These promptly followed: a CATL lithium battery factory in Zaragoza, an Envision battery project in Navalmoral de la Mata, and a China Three Gorges solar power plant in Murcia.

The Future of Spanish-Chinese Relations

Pedro Sánchez’s third trip to Beijing in April 2025, again with Zapatero as a trailblazer, reaffirmed close cooperation in food, health, cosmetics, culture, science, and education. This was again interpreted as Spain’s attempt to intervene in the face of trade threats from a potential second Donald Trump term and to act as a “Trojan Horse” to smooth China’s relations with Brussels.

Trade relations are flourishing: exports of Spanish companies to China increased by 17% in the first five months of the year, and imports have doubled in just seven years under the PSOE government. China is already Spain’s second-largest supplier. Spain, hand in hand with Sánchez, Zapatero, and José Blanco, remains Beijing’s most important outpost in the EU, a relationship that is causing increasing concern in Washington and Brussels, yet the Spanish executive seems firmly committed to maintaining this course and attracting further multi-million euro Chinese investments in the automotive, digital, and energy sectors.